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Editorial 
 
THINKING THE AID AND CARE RELATIONSHIP  
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DISABILITY: 
STAKES AND AMBIGUITIES 
 
 For approximately thirty years in Anglo-Saxon countries (Gilligan, 1982; Tronto, 
1993) and more recently in France (Garrau & Le Goff, 2012; Molinier, 2013; Paperman, 
2013; Paperman & Laugier, 2006) a school of the social sciences, called the ethics of care, 
has criticized the idea—carried by progressive thought since the Enlightenment—of a 
rational, autonomous, individual subject (the modern, Cartesian, Western subject). Indeed, for 
these authors, vulnerability and dependency are constitutive aspects of everyone, no matter 
who, and bring about a need for care. More specifically, these dependency relationships, 
viewed positively, have been analyzed as being at the source of a unique moral experience 
(Gilligan, 1982)—care, defined as attention to others, concern for their well-being and 
concrete activities targeting this well-being.  
 Use of the word ethics references this moral potential in dependency relationships: 
preserving these constitutive relationships for human beings, through care, is a moral stake on 
equal footing with the quest for justice. Hence the goal of this school of thought—to 
rehabilitate the practices and values linked to care, which are often hidden, implicit, or even 
denigrated. First focused on women and the “mother-child” relationship, thinking about them 
was careful to differentiate itself from a type of essentialism that others had ascribed to it and 
that claimed that women were “naturally” inclined to provide care to “naturally” weak beings 
(children, the ill, the elderly or disabled, etc.). Several authors called attention to this 
assigning of care work to certain social groups based on one’s belonging to a gender, class 
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and race (Glenn, 2009; Tronto, 1993). These authors showed that while care relationships are 
first interpersonal, they are also caught in a historical process and a broader social context. 
They analyzed how care dovetails and is defined across different levels: direct care 
relationships (micro level) and the social or institutional coverage of care needs (macro level), 
and by so doing invited questions about the borders between the private and the public 
spheres. Thus, the ethics of care, from the “standpoint of dependency” (E. F. Kittay, 1999), 
promotes a new figure—the person and citizen, fundamentally relational, that is elaborated 
and evolves by and in care relationships; it also emphasizes imbalance and the emotional 
dimension of this care relationship. 
 This school of thought encountered research on disability, but ran into—sometimes 
radical—criticism, notably from another school of thought that had grown out of the 
mobilization of disabled people: disability studies (Albrecht, Ravaud, & Stiker, 2001; 
Albrecht, Seelman, & Bury, 2001; Barnes, 1999; Longmore, 1985; Oliver, 1990).  
 Indeed, disability studies were developed on the basis of a protest against existing 
practices, notably those relating to the medicalization and institutionalization (and more 
particularly in the context of re-education and rehabilitation) of disabled persons, which were 
experienced as infantilizing, oppressive and segregating. In the 1970s, people with disabilities 
thus became involved in a collective protest movement (Anspach, 1979; Shakespeare, 1993; 
Zola, 1989). They reformulated their experience as one of “being excluded by society” and no 
longer as one of “individuals’ maladjustment to society.” They then defined disability as a 
social construct, a consequence of architectural, economic, legal and cultural barriers that 
society imposes on people with disabilities, rejecting the vision that had prevailed until then in 
which disability was the result of an individual’s biological and/or psychological deficiency.  
 It was in this way that the now known opposition between two models of disability—
the medical model and the social model—was formulated. Building on a negative and 
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pejorative vision of dependency, disability studies have on the contrary asserted the capacity 
of people with disabilities to decide for and by themselves and control their lives (“Nothing 
about us without us.”). In so doing, they criticized the normative nature of the able-bodied 
(that is to say the bio-functional standard that constitutes them), while promoting the idea of 
an autonomous subject that is the only one capable of defining and evaluating the services he 
or she wishes to receive and who must be able control them without being caught in 
emotional ties with the care provider (or “carer”). This demand—autonomy—associated with 
a denunciation of the domination relationships undergone until then in care practices was at 
the heart of the movement’s fight. This initially lead disability studies to reject the relevance 
of care thinking, and even to denounce it as a continuation of an ideology of dominating 
people with disabilities, who were perpetually portrayed as materially and emotionally 
dependent and passive (Fine & Glendinning, 2005; Keith, 1992; Morris, 1997; Silvers, 1995). 
In order to emphasize the determination of people with disabilities to have control and 
autonomy in their daily lives, these authors defended the implementation of a formalized and 
functional aid relationship of a contractual nature without any emotional dimensions. They 
used terms such as “help”, “support” and “personal assistance” to oppose the idea of care 
(Finkelstein, 1998; Shakespeare, 2000).  
 The divergences between these two schools of thought are anchored in the political 
and scientific history of each and derive notably from the viewpoint each adopted. The ethics 
of care analyzed care by insisting on the position of the carer and the capacities and values 
that the carer developed in the care relationship; disability studies, for their part, insisted on 
the position of the person receiving the care and on the subjugation to which the care 
relationship could lead. These divergences lead both schools to different concepts of the 
individual (dependent versus autonomous), of the nature of the relationships between people 
and making up society (relationships of interdependency versus relationships between 
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“autonomous” individuals) and therefore also of dependency (a jointly shared situation versus 
a subjugating situation to ban), etc.  
 However, beyond these divergences, these two schools shared a starting point—
criticism of how care was organized—and a goal—the emancipation and transformation of 
the status of the people concerned, whether providers or receivers of care. Thus, 
progressively, these two schools of thought deepened and developed critical feedback on their 
own stances. Some authors entered into a dialogue, re-examining thinking on care from the 
standpoint of disability or the inverse (Beckett, 2007; Hughes, Mckie, Hopkins, & Watson, 
2005; Kröger, 2009; Silvers, 1995; Watson, Mckie, Hughes, Hopkins, & Gregory, 2004; 
Williams, 2001). Beyond approaching care in terms of needs to meet, and receivers and 
providers, research on care insisted more and more on the notion of interdependency and 
relational autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). Eva Kittay (E. Kittay & Feder, 2002), a 
never-before published article by whom is presented in this issue, has shown that 
asymmetrical relationships are not necessarily relationships of domination, that care 
relationships are not unequivocal and that the positions of provider and receiver are not 
always assigned. In the field of disability studies, new generations have criticized the radical 
nature of the social definition of disability that completely ignored the experience of the body 
and disability and the intimate and private dimension of disability, and wanted to produce a 
less abstract vision of disabled people (Morris, 1991; Shakespeare, 2006; Thomas, 1999). 
Finally, other schools, such as the sociology of technology (Mol, Moser, & Pols, 2010; Pols, 
2004), have taken up the question of care, giving rise to a diversity of approaches that, beyond 
the initial feminist approach, combine the contributions of these different schools of thought. 
 The two special issues of the journal Alter on the topic of “care and disability” aim to 
extend the debate and dialogue begun between these different schools of thought on the nature 
of the aid relationship, its effects on the description and definition of people (aid providers 
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and aid receivers), and on the inherent ambiguities and tensions. These issues are the outcome 
of a call for articles that circulated in different institutional and national arenas across 
disciplinary divides, and were a great success. Thirteen articles1 will be published in these two 
issues. 
 In this first issue, we have assembled, around a submission by Eva F. Kittay, 
accompanied by a commentary by Marie Garrau, articles that discuss the issue of the care 
relationship “in daily life.” They look more specifically at the identity of care providers 
(women or men, spouses or fathers, brothers or sisters, family and friends or professionals), 
the nature of the relationship that grows between care providers and the people they aid and 
that sometimes extends over long periods of time. The care relationship covered here makes it 
possible to examine how people, their positions, their respective roles and their capacities can, 
in return, be redefined and redescribed. Analyzing concrete care situations and revealing the 
ambiguities in the relationships at work, each article examines in its own way the limits of 
both the ethics of care and disability studies.  
 The first article is that of E. Kittay. In this text, the author questions the link between 
the notion of normality and the definition of what constitutes a good life. Anchoring her 
philosophic reflections in her personal experience—that of the young daughter of Jewish 
parents who had survived the Holocaust, and then that of the mother of a child with a severe 
cognitive disability—she shows that these ties are ambiguous. First, we all want to be normal, 
recognized as such by others, and abnormality seems to be a barrier to a good life; second, no 
one wants to be loved simply for being normal, but rather as a unique being. In this way, 
normality appears as the backdrop against which everyone creates themselves as individuals 
with their own personality, and it is recognition that allows a good life. Yet, disability—
especially when severe—places the individual in abnormality and raises questions as to his or 
                                               
1 Initially, we received 47 proposed abstracts in response to the call for articles. This large number reflects the 
current interest in this topic and its vitality. 
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her ability to have a good life. To hold this philosophic discussion (make a good life possible 
for these people), E. Kittay offers to re-examine the notion of normality. She highlights 
various possible paths to redefine it, insisting not on rational capacities (that some heavily 
disabled people do not control) but rather on emotional capacities such as joy or pleasure (that 
can be shared by everyone). E. Kittay then invites us to reconsider the criteria for a good life, 
basing them not on the ability to do but also and above all on people’s capacity to be in 
relationships. 
 In her commentary, Marie Garrau situates E. Kittay’s reflections in her philosophical 
trajectory. She explains how E. Kittay renews thinking on care and criticism of the ethics of 
justice based on her personal experience as the mother of a child with a severe cognitive 
disability. This personal situation led E. Kittay to insist on extreme dependency and explore 
how this extreme dependency forces us to transform our views of justice and equality. Indeed, 
for E. Kittay, the moral equality between human beings lies in the fact that each of us, when 
we are born, receives (or should receive) care from others, their love or concern. Babies’ 
vulnerability and total dependency, shared by all, cause specific moral and social obligations: 
we should all receive the care we need. Justice then flows from a twofold condition: equality 
of access to care and society’s support of carers. Finally, M. Garrau explains how E. Kittay’s 
philosophical reflections—integrating her unique experience—is in and of itself part of her 
care for her daughter; and this care is both indirect, because through her thinking E. Kittay 
works to transform our values, and direct because this reflection makes her attentive to the 
complexity of her daughter’s situation. 
 In the third article, Maks Banens and Anne Marcellini examine the meeting between 
the ethics of care and disability by looking at male carers (husband, father and to a lesser 
extent brother) of people with disabilities. Starting from a qualitative survey of six situations, 
they analyze if and how the fact of being a man changes day-to-day care work and, inversely, 
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if and how care work modifies traditional gender roles. They show that disability generates 
stronger interdependency between family members and that male spouses are caught in 
“consented dependency” that paradoxically places them in a traditional masculine role of 
protector, a role that they did not necessarily play before. The authors show that, when done 
by men, care work does not necessarily or unequivocally transform the roles traditionally 
assigned by gender. 
 The following two articles, one by Antoine Hennion and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and one 
by Delphine Moreau and Christian Laval, echo each other. They also look at day-to-day care 
work, this time done not by family but by professionals. Based on a few concrete aid 
situations that they analyze in minute detail, these two articles question the tension—carried 
by the debate between the ethics of care and disability studies—between concern for the other 
and promotion of his or her autonomy, between the responsibility of the provider and his or 
her desire to protect the recipient, and the care recipient’s capacity to decide. A. Hennion and 
P. Vidal-Naquet thus ask if constraint is compatible with care. Examining home aid situations, 
they show that constraint, far from absent in care work, is always present, and that it is linked 
to body resistance or resistance from people and the need to “protect people despite 
themselves.” How care work is organized, the way in which people—aiders and aided—are 
involved in the relationship, contributes to constraint in different forms, which makes it 
perceptible (visible) or imperceptible (invisible); people—aiders and aided—try to move this 
constraint to the background, as a “mastered” and thereby acceptable constraint, but do not 
always manage to do so. This difficulty raises questions, doubts and uncertainties about what 
is good to do to help someone. Hence the authors’ proposal that care be though not only as 
concern but as “worry”, as a necessary questioning of care practices in real situations.  
 In their article, D. Moreau and C. Laval raise a very similar question: to what point 
should one not decide for another person? The article is based on an ethnography of the 
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“Housing First” program that consists of offering housing to homeless people with serious 
psychiatric conditions, and organizing their support by a multidisciplinary team in a “re-
establishment” process. This process relies on the capacity of people to get better by defining 
for themselves what is helpful and meaningful for them. Based on this program, the authors 
analyze the place of the aided person in the care relationship and in the definition of good 
care. They show similar tensions as those analyzed by A. Hennion and P. Vidal-Naquet, 
between the need to let people decide for themselves and the need to protect them. These 
tensions raise questions for professional teams about assessing the severity of the situation 
and the appropriate mode of intervention. These questions manifest stronger or weaker worry 
in different forms and trigger the shift from care based on individuals’ choices or at least a 
negotiation with them to care based on professional assessments. D. Moreau and C. Laval 
conclude their article by suggesting that this attempt to set up co-elaborated care seen in this 
program contains another tension, evoked by E. Kittay, between pre-defined normality and 
work on this normality, between norms recognized by stakeholders and the shift toward new 
norms of life and being.  
 The next article, written by Sarah Keyes, Sarah Webber and Kevin Beveridge, also 
addresses the tensions inherent in the care relationship and how this care relationship can lead 
not to subjugating but to empowering people. Rather than opposing the ethics of care and 
disability studies, the authors show that it is possible to combine their contributions to analyze 
how, in the aid relationship and therefore in some way based on a dependency relationship, 
people are made able to decide or do by themselves and in this way recover independence. 
After analyzing this question from the theoretical standpoint, the authors examine the question 
in practice: how can aid services be organized to make this combination concrete? Their 
response is based on two qualitative surveys in two aid services and a workshop that brought 
together researchers and field actors in Great Britain to discuss the challenges of this 
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combination of care and empowerment and how to organize—concretely—the services and 
relationships between recipients and professionals. The article thus discusses the theoretical 
and practical contributions of the notion of relational autonomy. 
 Finally, the last article is a research paper written by Jean-Luc Charlot. He presents the 
set up of a collective system to respond to the care needs of people with disabilities. It is the 
Ti’Hameau scheme: people with disabilities each rent an apartment in accessible housing 
units and, by pooling their compensation allowances, provide themselves with 24-hour-a-day 
human aid. J.-L. Charlot’s description of this system extends the previous reflections and 
opens broader questions about the notion of “social care” (Daly & Lewis, 1998; Martin, 2008) 
2 and the political and institutional dimensions of care.  
 In this way, through the range of articles published in this first special issue, readers 
will find an examination of “good care” and “good autonomy” to preserve. This crosscutting 
issue calls for, in varied organizational contexts in France and abroad, continued investigation 
into the link between ethical issues and policy and social intervention frameworks at different 
scales. In this issue, the reflections mainly focus on the “micro” dimension of care, how care 
is distributed and defined in the family or in the local community. The articles published in 
the next issue (forthcoming, first quarter of 2016) will more explicitly address the social and 
collective dimensions of care and its policy stakes (in the sense of an examination of the 
organization and composition of society). The point of convergence between the two issues is, 
ultimately, the question raised by E. Kittay regarding the definition of normality and therefore 
how this normality is relationally defined and can therefore be modified in concrete situations 
in function of the qualities and capacities of each person, the type of aid provided, etc. 
 
 
                                               
2 During the call for articles, we did not, to our regret, receive articles explicitly exploring public policies on 
care, that is to say the dovetailing of day-to-day care practices and relationships with social policy and the role of 
the State (the notion of social care).  
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